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You reach for the bowl with ‘sugar’ written on it only to discover, from the bad taste of your coffee, 
that it contained salt. Mundane experiences like these show that epistemic justification does not 
necessarily hold stable across possible changes of information. One can be justified in believing a 
proposition at a certain time (that the bowl contains sugar) and cease to be justified at a later time, 
as one enlarges one’s epistemic perspective (as one drinks a salty coffee). When this happens, one’s 
justification has been defeated. An epistemic defeater, broadly speaking, is that in terms of which 
the defeat of justification proceeds.  
The notion of an epistemic defeater is mostly associated with J. Pollock’s work on reasoning 
and inference. Pollock has provided the canonical definition of an epistemic defeater and proposed 
an influential taxonomy in terms of the way different types of defeaters induce their characteristic 
effects. The notion of an epistemic defeater has acquired a broader meaning in current 
epistemology, and several distinctions have been introduced that have contributed to a more 
nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of defeat as well as to complement Pollock’s original 
taxonomy.  
The correlated notion of a propositional defeater, defined in terms of would-be defeat of 
justification, is appealed to by the proponents of the defeasibility theory in the parallel debate about  
knowledge to explain what prevents a justified true belief from constituting knowledge in Gettier 
cases.  
1. Inference, Justification and Defeat 
To understand the notion of an epistemic defeater, it is useful to start from the notion of an 
inference and from the distinction between deductively valid and inductively strong inferences.   
Inference is a transition in thought whereby one comes to believe a proposition, the 
inference’s conclusion, on the basis of one’s beliefs in different propositions, called the inference’s 
premises. An inference is deductively valid if and only if, on condition of taking as inputs true 
beliefs, cannot but give true beliefs as outputs. It is inductively strong if and only if, on condition of 
taking as inputs true beliefs, it gives probable beliefs as outputs (see inductive 
inference). Inferences of either kind are especially valuable from an epistemological point of view. 
Suppose one justifiably believes P, and one is aware that Q can be inferred from P in either of the 
two senses. In this case, it is intuitive that one has (propositional) justification for believing Q; and 
that by actually inferring Q from P, one could acquire the (doxastically) justified belief that Q (see 
justification, epistemic).  
The epistemic justification deriving from either kind of inference differs in terms of its 
stability across possible enlargement of information. If an inference from P to Q is deductively 
valid, in no situation in which P is true Q can be false, no matter what else is true in that situation. 
So, no matter what new premises one justifiably believes, if one justifiably believes P one can 
always add those new premises and still transition via inference to the justified belief that Q. For 
instance, so long as one is justified in believing that Kant was married, one can transition to the 
justified belief that he wasn’t a bachelor, whether or not one also justifiably believes that he was 
left-handed, good looking or a relentless womanizer. Contrast this with the case in which the 
inference from P to Q is inductively strong. In this case, P can be true also in a situation in which Q 
is false, and the probability of Q given P is affected by whatever else is true in that situation. For 
this reason, whether or not one can justifiably infer Q from the justified belief that P also depends 
on what other premises one justifiably believes. For example, one could not justifiably infer that 
Hume wasn’t bald from the justified premise that he was always seen with flowing hair if one also 
justifiably believes that he used to wear a wig.  
When, as with Hume’s wig, one acquires information D that renders an otherwise good 
inference from P to Q inappropriate, one can retain one’s justified belief that P but one’s (would-be) 
justification for Q is negatively affected or entirely lost. In this case, it has become customary to 
call D an epistemic defeater of the justification for Q based on P. Moreover, it has become 
customary to say that inductive inferences are defeasible and that deductive inferences are 
indefeasible. For if P entails Q, no D can apparently downgrade the justification for Q so long as 
one retains the justification for P.  
Although this is a useful start, the reader must bear in mind that the notion of an epistemic 
defeater has a broader meaning in contemporary epistemology.  
To begin with, there is wide consensus that epistemic defeaters can negatively impinge on 
non-inferential justification, for instance on the justification for believing that (P) it rains based on 
(EX) a perceptual experience as of rain, as well as on inferential justification. This is a natural 
extension of the above notion of an epistemic defeater. For instance, when one learns that EX is 
hallucinatory, one may retain EX but intuitively one loses the justification for believing P based on 
this experience. 
Many epistemologists have also departed from the above notion of a defeater to a greater 
extent and have contended that deductive inferences are also defeasible. 
 
2. Defining Defeat  
We owe the canonical definition of an epistemic defeater to the work of J. Pollock (1974, 1986, 
1987). Though Pollock’s interest was primarily in defeasible reasoning, he mainly concentrated on 
epistemic reasons––that in terms of which reasoning proceeds––and on their defeat.  
For Pollock, A mental state M is a reason for a person S to believe P if and only if it is 
possible for S to be justified in believing that P on the basis of M (1987: 484). Reasons can be 
beliefs and non-doxastic states (like perceptual experiences), and the transition whereby one forms 
a belief on the basis of either kind of state counts for Pollock as a kind of inference or reasoning. 
Pollock thus advocates a broader notion of reasoning and lets the status of M as a reason for P 
depend on the quality of the reasoning from M to P in this broader sense.  
We can now move to Pollock’s notion of a reason’s defeater: 
DEF 
D is a defeater for M as a reason for P if and only if M is a reason for S to believe P, D is 
logically consistent with M, and M&D is not a reason for S to believe P. 
 
While DEF tells us what it takes for a reason to be defeated, contemporary epistemologists 
mainly understand defeat as having justification and knowledge as its target, and distinguish 
between prima facie––namely, conditional on there not being defeaters––and ultima facie––namely, 
all things considered––justification for P from M. Given how Pollock understands the notion of a 
reason, talk of D being a defeater for M as a reason for P can be translated without loss as talk of D 
being a defeater of S’s justification for P based on M.  
Some epistemologists deny that a belief can only be justified if it is supported by the 
subject’s reasons. These philosophers might object that DEF does not easily accommodate the 
defeat of this kind of justification. A. Goldman (1979) is a prominent example of this strand in the 
literature on defeaters. Goldman is an externalist who contends that a belief’s doxastic justification 
should be understood in terms of the reliability of the belief-forming process that has produced it 
and suggests that defeat should be understood accordingly (see Reliabilism). So, for Goldman, S’s 
belief that P is justified if and only if this belief is the output of a reliable belief-forming process, 
and this justification is defeated when S has available a (conditionally) reliable belief-forming 
process that wouldn’t produce the belief that P as output. BonJour (1985) suggests that, however it 
is analyzed, the notion of an epistemic defeater is foreign to the general spirit of externalism (see 
Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology). Grundmann (2009) criticizes Goldman’s account of 
defeat as unmotivated vis-à-vis the goal of truth, while Beddor (2015) adduces counterexamples 
against it.  
A second possible limitation of DEF is that it portrays defeat as an all-or-none phenomenon. 
Many epistemologists however conceive of defeat differently, as a graded phenomenon (e.g., 
Bergmann 2005). Those epistemologists typically distinguish between partial defeaters––which 
only induce a partial loss of justification––and full defeaters––whose effect is that justification is 
lost entirely.  
A third important limitation of DEF is that, by itself, this principle tells us when D has the 
right content for defeating M as a reason for P, but it doesn’t tell us when it actually induces the 
effects associated to defeat, namely when it becomes a mental state defeater in Bergmann (2006)’s 
sense. Most epistemologists would reply that in order for this to happen, to begin with, there has to 
be a moment in time when S’s justification for P based on M is in place. These epistemologists 
mean defeat in the revisionary sense, as always involving the revision of an antecedent epistemic 
status, and not in the contributory sense, in which an epistemic status is being prevented from being 
attained (Brown 2018). In addition to that, many epistemologists would add that S must form the 
(ultima facie) justified belief that D. But this answer is controversial for a number of reasons. 
Begin to consider that many epistemologists contend that perceptual experiences and 
withholdings can be epistemic defeaters. These epistemologists will want to make room for 
defeaters that do not meet the belief and the justification condition. Moreover, some controversy 
also surrounds the question whether all believed defeaters must be justified, and all justified 
defeaters must be believed. 
M. Bergmann (2005) has suggested that D can defeat M as a reason for P even if S 
unjustifiably believes D. It is enough, for instance, that S unjustifiably believes that M is unreliable. 
Along similar lines, J. Pryor (2018) has argued that hypothetical defeaters (that he contrasts with 
categorical defeaters) are unjustified considerations that can have a negative impact on doxastic 
(but not on propositional) justification. On the other hand, J. Lackey (2005) distinguishes between 
doxastic defeaters––namely, defeaters S actually believes––and normative defeaters––namely 
defeaters that one ought (epistemically) to believe and contends that the latter, whether or not they 
are believed, have the power to defeat. In the same spirit, S. Goldberg (2016, 2017) has contended 
that evidence one should have had, but that one doesn’t possess, has the power to defeat one’s 
justification.  
In recent years, DEF has also been targeted by criticisms that impugn its correctness more in 
general. Chandler (2013) has adduced an example in which a reason D appears at the same time to 
defeat P as a reason for Q and to supply fresh support for Q. A similar situation for Chandler 
engenders a dilemma that can only be avoided by redefining a defeater D of R as a reason for P, 
roughly, as a reason to not believe that R is a reason to believe P. More recently, Dutant & 
Littlejohn (2020) have contended that DEF is troubled by lottery cases, and that this motivates a 
knowledge-first account of defeat, according to which a defeater D of M as a reason for P is 
evidence that one is not in a position to know P on the basis of M. 
 
3. Propositional Defeaters 
The related notion of a propositional defeater has gained prominence in the post-Gettier debate on 
knowledge (see Knowledge, Concept of).  
Gettier (1963) has shown that a true belief can be justified yet attained at too accidentally to 
count as knowledge (see Gettier Problem). According to Lehrer & Paxson (1969) and Klein (1981), 
when this happens it is always because one’s justification is rendered unfit for knowledge by the 
existence of a propositional defeater.  
Suppose S has the true belief that P, and this belief is justified on the basis of M. A true 
proposition D is a propositional defeater for this belief, and by merely being true it prevents it from 
constituting knowledge, provided that S is not aware of D and if S acquired the (justified) belief that 
D, S would have her justification for P based on M defeated.  
Mental state defeaters, by defeating a belief’s justification, prevent it from constituting 
knowledge. The existence of a propositional defeater, on the contrary, is consistent with a belief’s 
retaining its justification. The capacity of a propositional defeater to impede knowledge is allegedly 
explained by the fact that knowledge requires justification which wouldn’t easily be lost by 
enlarging one’s information. This however is exactly what would happen, if S came to believe a 
propositional defeater.  
The defeasibility theory of knowledge is at the center of an ongoing debate. In a classic 
counterexample, a professor sees Tom Grabit steeling a book from the library. Unbeknownst to the 
professor, Tom Grabit’s mother has falsely declared that it was Tom’s twin to grab the book. The 
proposition describing the testimony of Tom’s mother meets the definition above of a propositional 
defeater, yet it is intuitive that the professor knows that Tom stole the book (Lehrer & Paxson 
1969). To handle this and similar counterexamples, defeasibility theorists of knowledge have tried 
to distinguish between misleading propositional defeaters, which would be unable to prevent 
knowledge, and genuine propositional defeaters, to which only that capacity should be ascribed. 
 
4. The Mechanics of Defeat  
Pollock has identified two main ways in which a reason D may act as a defeater for M as a reason 
for P. Since, for Pollock, defeat proceeds by making the reasoning from M to P inappropriate, these 
ways can be introduced by explaining how differently they accomplish this task. A rebutting or 
opposing defeater D for M as a reason for P compromises the transition from M to P by making 
available a better (or at least an equally good) transition (from D itself) to a proposition 
incompatible with P. This happens, for instance, when Arturo believes (P) that it is raining outside 
based on (M) the testimony of his sister Mafalda, and then looks out of the window thereby (D) 
seeing the sun shining. An undercutting or undermining defeater D of M as a reason for P 
compromises the inference from M to P by making available a new premise (D itself) which is a 
reason to believe that M is not indicative of P’s truth. In the example above, this would happen if 
Arturo realized (D’) that Mafalda is clueless about the current weather.  
 In what precedes, rebutting and undercutting defeaters are illuminated as reasons of a special 
sort. As such they can themselves be defeated by defeater-defeaters––namely, by additional 
defeaters of the first defeaters as reasons for the relevant propositions––, in which case the original 
justification may be reinstated or the initial defeating effect on this justification attenuated. New 
information may then be added which in turn defeats the defeater-defeater, and so on.   
One important difference between rebutting and undercutting defeaters is that the former 
always affect an old justification for believing a proposition by simultaneously supplying (some 
degree of) justification for believing a second proposition incompatible with the first. In contrast, 
the latter merely destroy or downgrade antecedent justification for believing a proposition without 
providing us with new justification for a second proposition to replace it.  
A second important difference explored in the current literature, which Pollock’s 
characterization of the distinction has been accused to overlook entirely, is this. Some authors have 
argued that the way rebutting and undercutting defeaters induce their characteristic effects is 
fundamentally different, because the latter, but not the former, require and interact with higher-
order presuppositions pertaining to the basis of the first-order beliefs whose justification they target 
(Sturgeon 2014; Melis 2014, 2016). According to Sturgeon, this is illustrated by examples in which 
one is unaware of the real basis M of one’s belief that P, and one’s justification for P based on M 
isn’t compromised by misleading evidence D that M was not indicative of P’s truth. For Sturgeon, 
these examples show that D can only undercut M as a reason for P if S believes that her belief that P 
is based on M. In response, Casullo (2018) has suggested that, even if we accept Sturgeon’s 
examples, we’re not bound to accept that rebutting and undercutting defeaters work in a 
fundamentally different way; for the claim that undercutting defeaters do, and that rebutting 
defeaters don’t, require and interact with higher-order presuppositions is of dubious coherence. 
More recently, McGrath (2020) has replied to Sturgeon by arguing that D can be an undercutting 
defeater of M as an inferential reason for P without the need of higher-order help and has suggested 
that the kind of defeat instantiated in Sturgeon’s examples, while only possible in the presence of 
the right higher-order commitments, is of a third sui generis kind of defeat (see §5).  
M. Bergmann (2006) has described a different way in which a reason D can be a defeater for 
M as a reason for P. A reason-defeating defeater defeats the justification for P based on M just 
when the justification for M is defeated. To illustrate, suppose Carolina justifiably believes that (M) 
it is snowing in Florence based on (M’) Luca’s testimony. In virtue of justifiably believing (M) 
Carolina has some justification to believe (P) that the Brunelleschi Dome will soon be covered in 
snow. Intuitively, when Carolina sees through a live webcam (D) that in Florence it is raining, she 
loses her justification for believing (M) based on (M’), thereby also losing her justification for 
believing (P).  
A reason-defeating defeater for M as a reason for P is a standard defeater for M’ as a reason 
for M. For this reason, to group them under a different label might be criticized as potentially 
misleading. It also deserves emphasis that to acknowledge reason-defeating defeater as sui generis 
is to extend the notion of an epistemic defeater beyond its original boundaries. On Pollock’s 
characterization of defeat, only inductive doxastic reasons and non-doxastic reasons can be 
defeated. However, reason-defeating defeaters target inductive and deductive reasons alike. To 
illustrate, suppose Carolina infers (M*) that ice crystals are falling in white flakes on Florence from 
(M). In this case (D) would be a (reason-defeating) defeater for (M) as a deductive reason for (M*).  
A different candidate for constituting a genuine alternative category of defeaters has 
emerged from the debate about pragmatic encroachment, the (not uncontroversial) thesis that the 
amount of epistemic support needed for knowing P varies with the practical stakes. The higher the 
practical cost of a mistake about P, the greater the amount of support needed to know P (Fantl & 
McGrath 2002, 2009; Stanley 2005). Pragmatic encroachers acknowledge that a shift in the 
practical stakes may induce a loss of knowledge that P even if it leaves S’s reasons for P in place. 
When this happens, it might appear natural to describe the considerations raising the stakes as a sui 
generis new kind of––interest-relative (Weatherson 2011)––defeater.   
  
5. Higher-Order Evidence and Defeat 
Recent epistemology has started to explore the hypothesis that S’s justification for believing P can 
be defeated in a way that is different in kind from more ordinary cases of rebutting or undercutting 
defeat. While ordinary cases of defeat involve evidence that is first-order, in the sense that it is 
evidence with a direct bearing on the likely truth of some target proposition P (Kelly 2016), the new 
kind of defeat would crucially involve higher-order evidence, namely evidence about whether the 
relevant belief is rational on that evidence (Coates 2012) or about whether it is the output of a 
flawed psychological process (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014). Examples of this kind of defeat would 
involve evidence that one was under the effect of a drug, mentally too tired, or victim of a condition 
like hypoxia. A different and widely discussed example involves disagreements with one’s 
epistemic peers, which is alleged to provide some indication that one has performed badly in 
processing the available evidence (see Epistemology of Disagreement).  
The claim that this sort of higher-order evidence can exert any defeating power is at the 
center of an ongoing debate. Moreover, those who accept higher-order defeaters as sui generis 
disagree about what keeps them apart from more mundane defeaters, like, in particular, 
undercutting defeaters.  
Let’s start by considering the second issue. Some philosophers subsume higher-order 
defeaters and undercutting defeaters under one single broad category (e.g. Pryor 2018; Constantin 
& Grundmann 2020), but the majority treats them as distinct in kind. R. Feldman (2005) has 
suggested that while the former question the existence of an evidential connection between the 
evidence and the target proposition, the latter simply indicate that a connection holding in general 
cannot be relied upon in present circumstances. D. Christensen (2010) has advanced the different 
suggestion that higher-order defeaters leave the connection between the evidence and the 
conclusion intact, and that they “attack” it just in the sense that they require the subject to put it 
aside, or to bracket it. Van Wietmarschen (2013) suggests that higher-order defeaters can impair the 
target belief’s doxastic justification by rescinding its basing relation to the original first-order 
evidence. The different hypothesis that higher-order defeaters supply direct reason for suspending 
the original judgment is explored in Sylvan & Lord (2020). 
As with other types of defeaters, higher-order evidence can be misleading. If higher-order 
defeat is a real phenomenon, this provides a new reason for contending that deductive inference is 
defeasible. Suppose one has competently deduced P from E but misleading higher-order evidence D 
indicates that E doesn’t entail P. In this case, D would defeat justification for P based on the 
entailing reason E. Precisely for this reason, the idea that higher-order evidence can defeat has met 
with some resistance. Some epistemologists, to begin with, find it counterintuitive to say that one 
may fail to justifiably believe P when one has competently deduced P from evidence that entails it! 
Moreover, cases of this kind have prompted some skepticism about the defeating power of higher-
order evidence tout court.  
M. Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) has developed an interesting challenge. Lasonen-Aarnio 
understands justification in terms of conformity to correct epistemic rules. On this view, to credit 
higher-order evidence D with the capacity to make the belief that P unjustified requires that, when 
one possesses D, believing P doesn’t conform to correct epistemic rules. But when E entails P, 
believing P on the basis of E may appear to conform to a correct epistemic rule! This, for Lasonen-
Aarnio, forces the proponent of higher-order defeat to opt for a two-tiered theory of justification, 
according to which justification is a matter (i) of conforming to correct epistemic rules, and (ii) of 
lacking evidence that one is not conforming to correct epistemic rules. The problem, for Lasonen-
Aarnio, is that the two-tiered account generates epistemic dilemmas: one correct epistemic rule may 
require to believe P, while another correct epistemic rule may require, upon receiving the higher 
order defeater, suspension of judgment about P.   
The debate about whether there are higher-order defeaters is intertwined with the parallel 
debate about whether epistemic akrasia can ever be rational, namely about whether it can ever be 
rational for S to believe P on the basis of E even if it is rational for S to believe that E does not 
adequately support P. Defenders of rational epistemic akrasia have to deny that the higher-order 
evidence has always the power to defeat first-order justification (e.g. Coates 2012; for a negative 
appraisal see Horowitz 2014 and Brown 2018). Note that to reject higher-order defeat, one does not 
have to accept that epistemic akrasia can be rational. One can reject higher-order defeat and the 
rationality of epistemic akrasia by denying that misleading higher-order evidence can ever justify 
the belief that E does not support P (e.g. Titelbaum 2015). 
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